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OPINION 
                     
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.  
 This breach of contract and fraud action is brought by 
real estate owners against the Resolution Trust Corporation 
("RTC") in its capacities as receiver for Carteret Savings Bank 
and as conservator of Carteret Federal Savings Bank.  The 
district court granted the RTC's motion to dismiss brought 
3 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Because we find that 12 
U.S.C. § 1823(e) bars plaintiffs-appellants' cause of action 
against the RTC, we will affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal. 
I. 
 The following facts are alleged in plaintiffs' 
complaints.  The plaintiffs are the victims of a widespread fraud 
perpetrated by General Development Corporation ("GDC").  GDC was 
one of the largest land development companies in Florida.  It 
primarily sold real estate to out-of-state residents using 
monthly installment contracts.  GDC's advertisements touted its 
low down payments and small monthly payments as making the 
"Florida dream" widely affordable. 
 After purchasing a GDC lot, GDC customers were 
encouraged to use the "equity" they had built up in their 
property as a down payment on a GDC house or condominium.  They 
were given, among other inducements, roast beef suppers at the 
local Holiday Inn, flyers portraying the joys of GDC home 
ownership, and personal attention by GDC sales representatives. 
During these sessions, prospective purchasers were told that, 
after taxes and rental income, the cost of owning a GDC home 
would be only slightly more than the payments they were making 
for their vacant lots. 
 Interested pre-qualified buyers were invited to travel 
to Florida to visit a GDC community and to choose a home from 
among numerous GDC models.  The cost of the trip ($299.00) could 
be applied against the sales price if they purchased a house or 
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condominium.  GDC representatives accompanied prospective 
purchasers from the time they departed for Florida until the time 
they returned home.  While in Florida, they stayed at GDC-
selected hotels, dined with GDC personnel, and traveled with GDC 
sales representatives to GDC communities.  The GDC contract to 
purchase was signed during the trip.  Under no circumstances were 
the purchasers allowed to extend their Florida stay or view other 
real estate development communities. 
 In addition to these hard-sell sales tactics, the GDC 
customers were persuaded to apply for a mortgage from GDC's 
"designated lender," GDV Financial Corporation ("GDV").  GDV, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of GDC, was created to finance the 
purchase of GDC houses, and to sell and service the mortgages. As 
part of the loan process, GDV had the GDC houses appraised. These 
appraisals failed to comply with industry guidelines.0 Instead, 
the homes were appraised in conformance with GDC's inflated 
selling price.  The houses were highly over-valued, and the 
mortgages were for amounts far greater than the market value of 
the real property that secured them.  The purchasers did not seek 
independent appraisals, nor did they retain legal representation 
in purchasing the real estate. 
 GDV entered into an arrangement with several 
institutional investors to sell the mortgages.  One of those 
investors, Carteret Savings Bank ("Carteret"), a federally 
                     
0Those guidelines are established by the Federal National 
Mortgage Corporation ("FNMA") and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation ("FHLMC"), respectively the first and second largest 
purchasers of residential homeowners' mortgages. 
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insured savings & loan, bought the mortgages despite the non-
conforming appraisals.  Carteret allegedly was aware of the non-
conforming appraisals, and purchased the mortgage loans with 
certain credit enhancements: it required GDV to obligate itself 
to repurchase the loans in case of a default, and further 
required that GDV's performance be secured by letters of credit 
and cash deposits.   
   On December 4, 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
ordered Carteret closed and appointed the RTC as its receiver. On 
that same date, the assets of the former Carteret were 
transferred to Carteret Federal Savings Bank, a newly chartered 
federal savings association, and the RTC was appointed 
conservator of the new bank. 
 Following an investigation, GDC as well as its 
directors were indicted and convicted of criminal fraud and 
conspiracy to commit fraud.  Both GDC and GDV filed for 
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  GDC emerged 
from bankruptcy as Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation and GDV 
was dissolved. 
 GDC customers Riccardo and Ruth Dimuzio filed an action 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
against the RTC as conservator of Carteret Federal Savings Bank 
and Carteret Savings Bank.  Kazuyuki Kameda, Taneko Kameda and 
Esmie Wint filed a class action against the RTC on behalf of 
those persons who obtained mortgage financing from GDV in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  These 
actions were transferred to the United States District Court for 
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the District of New Jersey, and consolidated by order of the 
district court on October 19, 1994.   
 Each complaint alleged, inter alia, breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of contract, fraudulent concealment, mortgage fraud, 
and unfair and deceptive trade practices.  Plaintiffs allege that 
GDV knew and failed to disclose that: (1) the loan arranged would 
result in the purchasers losing their cash equity in the lot they 
traded in; (2) the GDV appraisal of the housing unit was 
inaccurate and did not conform to industry standards; (3) no 
lender applying industry standards would accept the GDV appraisal 
or make a purchase money loan in the amount requested; and (4) 
GDV, because of its GDC-controlled status, had a conflict of 
interest and did not intend to negotiate a conventional arms-
length loan as requested by the purchasers in their loan 
applications.  Plaintiffs further allege that Carteret knew or 
should have known of GDC's and GDV's concealment of material 
facts upon which the notes were secured.   
 The district court dismissed the complaints pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that plaintiffs' causes of 
action were precluded by Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, 
Inc., 937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1991) and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).0  This 
appeal followed. 
                     
0Although the RTC advanced a number of grounds in support of its 
motion to dismiss, the district court relied upon § 1823(e) to 
decide the motion.  On this appeal, the RTC seeks an affirmance 
on this statutory basis.  Accordingly, our discussion is limited 
to § 1823(e), and we need not apply the federal common law 
doctrine of D'Oench, Duhme.  Indeed, we note that the D'Oench, 
Duhme doctrine may no longer be a separate bar to plaintiffs' 
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II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this case 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This is an appeal 
from the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Accordingly, our review is 
plenary.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
III. 
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 includes a 
provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), which is generally thought to 
codify the result reached in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 
U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 676 (1942).  See Adams v. Madison Realty & 
Development, Inc., 937 F.2d 845, 852 (3d Cir. 1991)(citing FDIC 
v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 745 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  Section 1823(e) provides: 
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the 
interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it 
... either as security for a loan or by purchase or as 
receiver of any insured depository institution, shall 
be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement 
-- 
 
(1) is in writing, 
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any 
person claiming an adverse interest thereunder, 
including the obligor, contemporaneously with the 
acquisition of the asset by the depository institution, 
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the 
depository institution or its loan committee, which 
approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said 
board or committee, and  
                                                                  
claims.  See, O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 
2048 (1994); Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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(4) has been, continuously, from the time of its 
execution, an official record of the depository 
institution.   
 
 One purpose of this section is to permit federal and 
state bank examiners accurately and quickly to assess the 
financial condition of a federally insured depository institution 
by examining its books and records.  The statute accomplishes 
this objective, in part, by limiting the enforceability of 
"agreements" affecting the institution's assets held by the 
receiver to those that are properly recorded in the books and 
records of the institution.  See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 
108 S. Ct. 396 (1987).    
 A second purpose of § 1823(e), implicit in its 
requirement that the agreement be executed "contemporaneously" 
with the acquisition of the asset and approved by officially 
recorded action of the bank's board or loan committee, is to 
"ensure mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by 
senior bank officials, and prevent fraudulent insertion of new 
terms, with the collusion of bank employees, when a bank appears 
headed for failure."  Langley, 484 U.S. at 91, 108 S. Ct. at 401. 
 The Supreme Court has construed the word "agreement" 
broadly in the context of § 1823(e).  In Langley, the plaintiffs 
purchased real estate from a federally insured bank and were 
obligors on an unconditional promissory note.  When the bank 
sought to collect on the note, the Langleys sued to avoid 
payment, claiming that the bank had made misrepresentations 
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concerning the value and amount of the real estate at issue. 
After the bank failed, the FDIC was substituted as a party.   
 The Langley Court held that § 1823(e) bars a claim of 
fraud in the inducement when an obligor seeks to avoid payment on 
a note that has come into the FDIC's possession.  The Court 
reasoned that for purposes of the statute, the term "agreement" 
includes warranties concerning real estate, the truthfulness of 
which is a condition precedent to the Langleys' obligation to pay 
the note.  Because this "agreement" had not been recorded on the 
bank's records, the Court held that the defense of fraud in the 
inducement was statutorily barred. 
 In Adams, 937 F.2d at 845, we held that § 1823(e) 
extends to any warranty on which a party's performance is 
conditioned, and is not limited to obligations made between a 
bank and its obligor.  In Adams, the plaintiffs had executed 
promissory notes for investments in fraudulent tax shelters. 
Although each of the notes was payable to one of three originator 
banks, the notes were eventually purchased on the secondary 
market by Empire of America Federal Savings Bank, a federally 
regulated savings and loan.  The RTC was appointed as conservator 
of Empire and came into possession of the notes.  The Adams court 
held that plaintiffs had not made the agreement, i.e., 
representations and warranties related to the fraudulent tax 
shelters, part of the official bank record.  Thus, the 
requirements of § 1823(e)(3) were not satisfied.  
 The Adams court specifically rejected the plaintiffs' 
claim that § 1823(e) was inapplicable in cases where the obligors 
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had no direct dealings with a federally regulated depository 
institution: 
Langley makes it clear that the "agreement" covered by 
§ 1823(e) and the D'Oench doctrine extends to any 
warranty on which a party's performance is conditioned. 
There is absolutely no indication that the Court's 
reasoning should be limited to obligations between a 
bank and its obligor. 
 
Adams, 937 F.2d at 858.  Therefore, § 1823(e) applies to 
agreements between an obligor and parties other than a depository 
institution. 
 
A. 
 A threshold question exists in this case as to what is 
the "agreement" that diminished or defeated the interest of the 
RTC in its acquisition of the subject promissory notes. 
Appellants contend, and the district court found, that the 
"agreement" sought to be enforced is the home appraisals and the 
Loan Purchase Agreements between GDV and Carteret.  The district 
court concluded that the "agreement" in the form of the Loan 
Purchase Agreements and the appraisals met the "in writing" 
requirement of § 1823(e)(1).   
 Although the appraisals may be evidence of the alleged 
fraud, they are not a written form of the representations and 
warranties regarding the real estate, the truthfulness of which 
is a condition precedent upon which the plaintiffs base their 
claims.  Specifically, the appraisals were not a bargained for 
promise or warranty that the real estate was priced at market 
value.  See, Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. at 91. ("agreement" under 
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§ 1823(e) is a warranty or a promise which imposes duties or 
conditions.).  Similarly, the Loan Purchase Agreements did not 
diminish the interest of the RTC; nor were the plaintiffs parties 
to these agreements.  Accordingly, we reject the district court's 
conclusion that the "agreement" in this case is the appraisals 
and Loan Purchase Agreements.   
 Representations and warranties regarding the real 
estate, the truthfulness of which was allegedly a condition 
precedent to the plaintiffs' obligations to repay the notes, 
would constitute an "agreement" that diminishes the interest of 
the RTC.  There are no allegations that such an "agreement" was 
put in writing.  Therefore, the agreement in this case does not 
meet the "in writing" requirement of § 1823(e)(1).0 
 
B. 
  Appellants next assert that because § 1823(e) always 
would bar a claim in a situation such as the one presented in 
                     
0One purpose of the writing requirement in § 1823(e) is to enable 
bank examiners to make reliable examinations of the bank's worth.  
Langley, 484 U.S. at 91.  Judge Sarokin in his dissent maintains 
that, in this case "the RTC could evaluate the worth of 
Carteret's assets and examine these appraisals and agreements 
and indeed, discover the fraud alleged by the plaintiffs." 
Dissent typescript at 7.  We respectfully disagree.  Plaintiffs' 
complaints allege that the official bank record included 
appraisals stating that they were not made in accordance with 
FNMA/FHLMC guidelines, and that Carteret was aware of this fact 
when it bought the Loan Purchase Agreements.  We cannot say, 
based on these allegations, that the official bank record showed 
on its face that the notes were procured by fraud in the 
inducement.  Nor can we conclude, as Judge Sarokin does, that 
these documents put the bank examiners "on notice" of the real 
worth of the assets.  Dissent typescript at 7-9. 
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this case, we should decline to apply it.  The obligors here seek 
to avoid payment on promissory notes which have been purchased by 
a depository institution on the secondary market.  They claim 
that such an "agreement" could never be executed by the 
depository institution and the obligor contemporaneously with the 
depository institution's acquisition of the asset as required by 
§ 1823(e)(2).  
 The fact that it is not possible for the 
representations and warranties made in this case to constitute an 
"agreement" that meets the contemporaneous requirement of 
§1823(e)(2), however, does not inextricably lead to the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend the recording statute to 
apply in these cases, or that an exception should be carved out 
of the statute.  Adams teaches that § 1823(e) applies to 
"agreements" between obligors and third parties and, therefore, 
applies in this case.  Adams cannot be overruled except by an in 
banc court. IOP Chapter 8. Hearing or Rehearing in Banc.   
 We note that every other court of appeals that has 
considered this issue has come to the same conclusion as we did 
in Adams.  See Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA Mortg. Corp., 928 F.2d 
1077, 1083 (11th Cir. 1991) (§ 1823(e) does not only apply where 
the note is initially executed in favor of a bank); Chatham 
Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1981) (§ 1823(e) makes no exception for agreements initiated by a 
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third party and the obligors), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 972, 102 S. 
Ct. 2234 (1982).0 
 Appellants contend that Adams is distinguishable 
because the representations at issue in Adams were oral, while 
the "agreement" here, the Loan Purchase Agreements and 
appraisals, was in writing.  As we have determined that the 
"agreement" in this case--the representations and warranties made 
by GDV and GDC to the plaintiffs--was not in writing, Adams is 
not distinguishable on this basis. 
 Appellants also argue that Adams is distinguishable 
because the Adams court affirmed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment whereas here the district court granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss without giving appellants the 
opportunity to discover Carteret's records at the time it 
purchased the notes.  This argument must also be rejected. 
Accepting, as we must, all allegations of fact as true, 
appellants would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
facts which could be proven in support of their claims. 
Appellants concede the point by arguing that § 1823(e)(2)'s 
contemporaneous requirement could not possibly be met under the 
facts of this case. 
                     
0Judge Sarokin in his dissent suggests there is an emerging 
circuit split on whether the contemporaneous requirement must be 
strictly interpreted.  Dissent typescript at 10.  However, the 
case upon which he principally relies, RTC v. Midwest Federal 
Sav. Bank of Minot, 36 F.3d 785, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1994), did not 
involve a note that was purchased on the secondary market. 
Moreover, FDIC v. Manatt, 922 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1991) expressly 
left open the question of the reach and scope of § 1823(e)(2). 
Id. at 489 n.4.   
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 Appellants next assert that because of market 
realities, an obligor whose promissory note is purchased on the 
secondary market can never execute an agreement contemporaneously 
with the bank's acquisition of the note, and, therefore, an 
equitable exception to the statute should apply in this case. 
They claim that the Adams court did not recognize such an 
equitable exception because the appellants in Adams knew that 
they were creating negotiable instruments, whereas here, the 
appellants did not know their notes were negotiable.  This 
distinction is not dispositive.  We agree that Adams raised the 
issue of the possible availability of an equitable exception to 
§1823(e).  That discussion, however, was dictum included in the 
opinion after the court had already held that § 1823(e) applied 
in that case.  The Langley Court similarly rejected the 
availability of an equitable exception after it reached its 
holding.  Langley, 484 U.S. at 96, 108 S. Ct. at 403.  We 
likewise will not carve out an equitable exception.    
 As the Supreme Court stated in Langley, "Congress opted 
for the certainty of the requirements set forth in § 1823(e). . . 
. Such a categorical recording scheme is of course not unusual." 
Langley, 484 U.S. at 95, 108 S. Ct. at 403.  Either the statutory 
requirements are met or they are not.  We cannot ignore the plain 
language of the statute and binding precedent of our court to 
reach an arguably more equitable result.  If Congress wishes to 
provide relief to obligors whose promissory notes were procured 
by fraud and later transferred on the secondary market to a 
federal insured depository institution, it may amend the statute 
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accordingly.  We have no reason to believe that Congress intended 
to exempt from the recording statute a situation such as the one 
presented in this case.0 
 The order of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' 
complaints pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) will be affirmed. 
                     
0Judge Sarokin argues in his dissent that the contemporaneous 
requirement "must be read in light of commercial reality.  When 
there exists a secondary market for mortgage notes, the original 
loan and subsequent acquisition will never be precisely 
contemporaneous."  Dissent typescript at 12.  We agree that it is 
virtually impossible for an original loan and subsequent 
acquisition on a secondary market to be made contemporaneously. 
We further agree that there is a dearth of legislative history to 
this statute.  However, it is hornbook law that in interpreting 
undefined statutory language, we must look to the term's common 
usage and general acceptance.  Hertz Corporation v. United 
States, 268 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 122, 80 
S. Ct. 1420 (1960).  "Contemporaneous" means "living, existing or 
occurring at the same time."  Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 575 
(2nd ed. 1959).  Therefore, we respectfully disagree with Judge 
Sarokin that Congress intended contemporaneous to mean "not 
precisely contemporaneous."  We conclude that any "agreement" 
that is not entered into at the same time as the acquisition of 
the asset fails to meet the contemporaneous requirement of 
§1823(e)(2). 
16 
 
Dimuzio v. RTC, No. 95-5066 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 The RTC as receiver accepts an insolvent institution's 
portfolio in its then-posture.  The RTC is entitled to rely upon 
what it discovers in the records of the institution in evaluating 
its financial condition and determining what future action to 
take as a result of that examination.  The purpose of § 1823(e) 
is to avoid subjecting the RTC to claims or defenses not readily 
apparent from a reasonable inspection of the documents maintained 
by the insolvent institution in the ordinary course of its 
business.  The RTC, as contrasted to the FDIC, has no discretion 
to deal with the institution's assets and liabilities other than 
as it finds them. 
 Here, the fraud about which plaintiffs complain 
virtually leaps out from the documents, and it is thus eminently 
clear that there was evidence that the institution had knowledge 
and notice of the fraud when it acquired the loans.  Clearly if 
Carteret acquired the loans with such knowledge, it took them 
subject to the claims and defenses of the defrauded borrowers. 
The question raised here is whether the applicable statute 
defeats those claims and defenses if asserted against the RTC. In 
my view it does not, and thus I respectfully dissent and would 
reverse. 
I. 
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 In reviewing this case below, the district court 
examined the third Loan Purchase Agreement between Carteret and 
GDV.  Dimuzio, et al. v. RTC, No. 94-1559, slip op. at 14 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 15, 1994).  Indeed, the Loan Purchase Agreements between GDV 
and Carteret are at the center of this case, as they are written 
documents demonstrating that Carteret was aware that GDV's 
appraisals were inflated above the fair-market value of the sites 
and did not conform to the standards of the Federal National 
Mortgage Association ("FNMA") or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation ("FHLMC").  In all Carteret entered into three bulk 
purchase agreements with GDV.  As to mortgages issued under GDV's 
"Lot Trade Program," in which plaintiffs participated, the 
commitment letter which was incorporated into the third purchase 
agreement provided: 
Appraisal reports on the housing package and 
condominiums do not conform to FNMA/FHLMC guidelines. 
These appraisals are based on prices of comparable 
units sold by General Development and may not reflect 
the sales price of similar properties offered by local 
builders or the resale price of the home in the local 
market.  Accordingly, there can be no assurance that 
the appraised value can be realized in the event of 
foreclosure, liquidation or sale of the property. 
Appendix ("App.") at 195.  Carteret's second bulk purchase 
agreement and the incorporated commitment letter with GDV 
contained very similar language.  These two agreements also 
acknowledged that because the appraisals were non-conforming, the 
loans could not be sold to FNMA or FHLMC.0 
                     
0Carteret's first commitment letter with GDV did not state that 
the appraisals were non-conforming or the reason for this 
failure, but Carteret did acknowledge "[w]e also understand that 
these loans are not salable [sic] to FNMA."  App. at 179.  It is 
not clear from the complaint whether Carteret purchased 
18 
II. 
 The majority's general discussion of 12 U.S.C. §1823(e) 
and the case law interpreting it, Majority Opinion, typescript at 
7-10, is well presented, and I concur in their overall conclusion 
therein that § 1823(e) is applicable to the mortgages in this 
case. 
A. 
 The majority correctly concludes that, under Langley v. 
FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987) and Adams v. Madison Realty & 
Development, Inc., 937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Adams II"), the 
misrepresentations alleged by plaintiffs in the inflated, non-
conforming appraisals of the GDC properties constitute an 
"agreement" for purposes of § 1823(e).  As we set forth in Adams 
II, "any warranty on which the performance of a party is 
conditioned is an 'agreement' within the meaning of section 
1823(e)."  Adams II, 937 F.2d at 853.  See also FDIC v. Bathgate, 
27 F.3d 850, 862 (3d Cir. 1994) (agreements include "promises to 
perform acts [and] conditions to the performance of a party's 
obligation").  Accordingly, we have held that misrepresentations 
underlying a claim of fraud in the inducement are "agreements" 
and hence enforceable against the RTC only when they satisfy the 
four requirements of § 1823(e).  Adams II, 937 F.2d at 857.  The 
misrepresentations in GDV's appraisals are thus "agreements" for 
purposes of § 1823(e). 
B. 
                                                                  
plaintiffs' mortgages pursuant to the first, second, or third 
agreement. 
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 Similarly, I agree with the majority that under Adams 
II we are constrained to conclude that, although plaintiffs 
executed the loans with something other than a depository 
institution, the loans are nonetheless subject to § 1823(e).  
Adams involved the application of § 1823(e) to a situation where, 
just as here, the RTC acquired notes initiated by a mortgage 
company by taking over a failed bank that had purchased the notes 
on the secondary market.  Adams II, 937 F.2d at 850 (citing Adams 
v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 164-65 (3d 
Cir. 1988) ("Adams I")).  In concluding that it was appropriate 
to apply § 1823(e) to the agreement in Adams II, we looked 
specifically to the fact that, even though the loans had been 
purchased on the secondary market, plaintiffs obligations 
ultimately ran to the failed bank when the bank acquired 
plaintiffs' notes.  Id. at 858.    
 The facts of Adams are indistinguishable from those in 
the instant case for purposes of determining whether § 1823(e) 
applies, and I thus agree with the majority that § 1823(e) 
necessarily applies here.  
  
 
III. 
 Unlike the majority, however, I conclude that the home 
appraisals and Loan Purchase Agreements between GDV and Carteret 
should be considered as part of the "agreement" for purposes of 
§1823(e).   
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 In Langley, the Supreme Court held that 
misrepresentations made by a bank regarding the acreage of land, 
"the truthfulness of which was a condition to performance of 
[petitioners'] obligation to repay the loan," constituted an 
"agreement" for purposes of applying § 1823(e).  Langley v. FDIC, 
484 U.S. at 90-91.  In my view it would be ironic and 
inconsistent to give a broad meaning to "agreement," so as to 
incorporate oral representations and warranties, but then exclude 
written appraisals and loan documents upon which the parties 
relied in acquiring the loans.  Thus, it is difficult to accept, 
under Langley's analysis, that the written appraisals in this 
case "are not a written form of the representations and 
warranties regarding the real estate." Majority Opinion, 
typescript at   .  Just as the petitioners in Langley, plaintiffs 
accepted loans based on representations by the lender that the 
plaintiffs now allege to be false.  The written non-conforming 
appraisals in the instant case were acquired by GDV, and were 
designed to support the selling price of the GDC houses.  In 
providing these appraisals to plaintiffs without disclosing that 
they were inaccurate and did not conform to industry standards, 
GDV represented that the properties GDC was selling to plaintiffs 
were actually worth the appraisal amount -- a condition upon 
which the plaintiffs relied.  The appraisals thus plainly are 
part of the agreement.  Adams II, 937 F.2d at 853 (holding "any 
warranty on which the performance of a party is conditioned is an 
'agreement' within the meaning of section 1823(e)").   
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 In addition, in considering the "agreement" to which 
§1823(e) applies, we must also consider the Loan Purchase 
Agreements between GDV and Carteret but for different reasons. It 
is through these Loan Purchase Agreements that Carteret has 
become the bank to which the plaintiffs are obliged.  See Adams 
II, 937 F.2d at 858 (holding that plaintiffs became obligors to 
the failed bank that bought their promissory notes on the 
secondary market).  While we held in Adams II that the 
application of § 1823(e) should not be "limited to obligations 
between a bank and its obligor,"  Adams II, 937 F.2d at 858, we 
also concluded that alternative grounds for applying § 1823(e) 
also existed -- namely that the transferal of the loans to the 
failed bank meant that the plaintiffs were the obligors of the 
bank, and that the statute applied because of that link.  This is 
the exact situation that exists here; the plaintiffs are 
Carteret's obligors.  It is only logical, then, that the 
documents transferring plaintiffs' obligations to Carteret -- the 
Loan Purchase Agreements -- be considered as part of the 
agreement for purposes of applying § 1823(e).   
 Furthermore, we must remember that one of the principle 
purposes of § 1823(e) is "to allow federal and state bank 
examiners to rely on a bank's records in evaluating the worth of 
the bank's assets." Langley, 484 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, in Adams II, this court examined "the extent [to which 
the] promises [at issue] were made a part of the bank's official 
records." Adams II, 937 F.2d at 857 (emphasis added). The 
contents of Carteret's official records, complete with the Loan 
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Purchase Agreements and the home appraisals, then, are the 
appropriate subject of the § 1823(e) analysis.  It is from these 
official records that one could find that the RTC could evaluate 
the worth of Carteret's assets and examine these appraisals and 
agreements and indeed, discover the fraud alleged by the 
plaintiffs.0   
 This conclusion is not undermined by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Langley.  There, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the FDIC's knowledge of a misrepresentation at the time it 
acquired a note is not relevant to whether § 1823(e) applies. 
Langley 484 U.S. at 94.   The Court reasoned that: 
[h]arm to the FDIC . . . is not avoided by 
knowledge at the time of acquiring the note. 
The FDIC is an insurer of the bank, and is 
liable for the depositors' insured losses 
whether or not it decides to acquire the 
note.  The harm to the FDIC caused by the 
failure to record occurs no later than the 
time at which it conducts its first bank 
examination that is unable to detect the 
unrecorded agreement and to prompt the 
invocation of available protective measures, 
including termination of the bank's deposit 
insurance.  Thus, insofar as the recording 
provision is concerned, the state of the 
FDIC's knowledge at that time is what is 
crucial. 
Id. at 94-95 (citations omitted).       
                     
0Indeed, when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), courts are to determine "whether in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his 
behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."  5A 
Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1357, at 332-36.  Under such a standard, any doubts 
as to whether the non-conforming nature of the appraisals put 
Carteret and the RTC on notice that plaintiffs had been defrauded 
must thus be resolved in plaintiffs' favor.   
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 In the RTC's context, by contrast, knowledge of a 
bank's assets is important at the time the RTC acquires them, not 
before.  There are no measures the RTC could take to protect 
itself before this time, as opposed to the FDIC which could opt 
not to insure a bank.  In this case, the purpose of the recording 
provision is to apprise the RTC of the bank's assets so it can 
determine the appropriate course of action, and the RTC looks to 
the bank's official records in order to do this. 
 
  IV. 
 Concluding as I do that the "agreement" to be 
considered here includes the home appraisals and Loan Purchase 
Agreements, I now look to see whether this agreement meets the 
four requirements of § 1823(e).  I believe that it does. 
A. 
 In considering whether the agreement meets the "in 
writing" condition of § 1823(e)(1), we have held that "no 
agreement between a borrower and a bank which does not plainly 
appear on the face of an obligation or in the bank's official 
records is enforceable against the FDIC."  Adams II, 937 F.2d at 
852.  More recently, we "slightly extend[ed]" Adams II to add 
that, "not only does the existence of the agreement have to 
appear plainly on the face of an obligation, but the basic 
structure of that agreement -- its essential terms -- must also 
appear plainly on the face of that obligation."  RTC v. Daddona, 
9 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also Bathgate, 27 F.3d at 
864. 
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 Not surprisingly, in "misrepresentation" cases, 
plaintiffs have often failed to satisfy the writing requirement. 
See Langley, 484 U.S. at 89 ("No reference to these 
representations appears in the documents executed by 
[plaintiffs]"); Adams II, 937 F.2d at 857 ("Since plaintiffs did 
not make these promises part of the official records, they are 
estopped from raising their claims of fraud in the inducement 
against the RTC"); Daddona, 9 F.3d at 317; Bathgate, 27 F.3d at 
865-66.  In most instances of fraudulent inducement, it would be 
rare to find the fraud in the documents themselves.  But bearing 
in mind that the documents must place the RTC on notice, the 
requirement is sound.   
 The district court concluded that, in this instance, 
the writing requirement was satisfied.  For reasons I explained 
above, I believe that the district court correctly looked to 
Carteret's records and the third Loan Purchase Agreement with 
GDV, which acknowledged that the appraisals were non-conforming 
and likely in excess of the fair market value, as well as the 
appraisals themselves.  Dimuzio. et al. v. RTC, No. 94-1559, slip 
op. at 14 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 1994).  The non-conformity of the 
appraisals, and importantly the recognition that the appraisals 
may not reflect the fair market or resale value of the 
properties, "plainly appear on the face," Adams II, 937 F.2d at 
852, of the second and third Loan Purchase Agreements.  App. at 
190-91, 195.  Moreover, the "basic structure" of the alleged 
misrepresentation, Daddona, 9 F.3d at 317, namely the reliance on 
non-conforming, inflated appraisals in calculating the 
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plaintiffs' mortgages, appears plainly on the face of the 
agreements.  Thus, although the commitment in writing of 
representations that fraudulently induce borrowers to execute a 
loan may be rare, I conclude that such is the case here and that 
the first criteria of § 1823(e) is satisfied. 
B. 
 The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on 
the ground that Carteret's Loan Purchase Agreement from GDV was 
not executed contemporaneously with the original mortgages 
between GDV and plaintiffs, thus failing the requirement of 
§1823(e)(2).  Certainly it is undisputed that these two 
transactions were separated by a period of years.  I believe the 
district court's conclusion, however, is premised on a flawed 
construction of § 1823(e)(2). 
 We have not previously considered the meaning of the 
"contemporaneous execution" condition, but a split may be 
emerging among other circuits.  Some courts have strictly 
enforced this requirement.  See, e.g., FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping 
Center, Inc., 791 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1986) (lease executed 
two years before note unenforceable); Cardente v. Fleet Bank of 
Maine, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 603, 611 (D.Me. 1992) (lease executed 
two weeks before note unenforceable, where note lacks any 
reference to lease); RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887, 892-94 (N.D. 
Tex. 1991) (refinancing agreement signed three years after 
execution of original loan unenforceable). 
 More recently, however, the Eighth Circuit suggested 
that the contemporaneous execution requirement might be best 
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understood in light of "general business practice."  FDIC v. 
Manatt, 922 F.2d 486, 489 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991) (observing accord 
and satisfaction will necessarily be executed subsequent in time 
to original note), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).0  Adopting 
the Eighth Circuit's suggestion, the Ninth Circuit held that 
"satisfaction of the contemporaneousness requirement should be 
considered in light of commercial reality."  RTC v. Midwest 
Federal Sav. Bank of Minot, 36 F.3d 785, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1994). 
The Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that a commitment letter 
executed more than two months before loan documents had satisfied 
the contemporaneous execution requirement.  Id.  See also 
Erbafina v. FDIC, 855 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1994) (commitment 
letter negotiated several days before execution of loan satisfies 
§ 1823(e)(2)). 
 A review of the legislative history of § 1823(e), which 
was enacted in 1950 and slightly amended in 1989, lends no 
insight into the legislative intent behind the contemporaneous 
execution requirement.  See H.R. Rep. No 2564, 81st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1950), reprinted at 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3765; Conf. Rep. No. 
3049, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted at 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3776; H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 
                     
0Prior to its decision in Manatt, the Eighth Circuit had relied 
on a strict interpretation of the contemporaneousness requirement 
to conclude that he Eighth and Ni executed five months before the 
making of a note was unenforceable.  FDIC v. Virginia Crossings 
Partnership, 909 F.2d 306, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1990).  However, 
Manatt suggests that Virginia Crossings may no longer be good law 
in the Eighth Circuit, although the panel there declined to 
overrule it explicitly since "an interpretation of [§ 1823(e)(2)] 
[was] not necessary to a decision in [that] case."  Manatt, 922 
F.2d at 489 n.4.  
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reprinted at 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86; Conf. Rep. No. 222, 101st 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted at 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432. 
 On balance I am persuaded by the reasoning of the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, and conclude that § 1823(e)(2) must be 
read in light of commercial reality.  When there exists a 
secondary market for mortgage notes, the original loan and 
subsequent acquisition will never be precisely contemporaneous. 
Nonetheless, where execution of a side agreement either (1) is 
contemporaneous with origination of a note, and the "basic 
structure of the agreement," Daddona, 9 F.3d at 319, is evident 
from the face of the resale documents, or (2) is contemporaneous 
with a bank's acquisition of a note in the secondary market, then 
§ 1823(e)(2) should be satisfied.   
 In addition to the respect for common sense and 
commercial reality which shaped the decisions of the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, my conclusion is supported by several other 
considerations.  First, it would be contradictory and illogical 
to rely on the Loan Purchase Agreements as the link that made 
plaintiffs Carteret's obligors and thus requires that § 1823(e) 
applies in this case, but then disregard those same agreements in 
considering § 1823(e)(2). 
 Second, my construction of § 1823(e)(2) comports with 
the legislative intent identified by the Supreme Court as 
underlying § 1823(e), namely that bank examiners be on notice of 
the real worth of an asset, that "unusual transactions" be 
approved by senior bank officials, and that "new terms" not be 
added to a loan subsequent to its origination.  Langley, 484 U.S. 
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at 92.  These concerns are met by enforcing the requirement that 
either (1) a side agreement be executed contemporaneous with a 
bank's acquisition of a note on the secondary market, or (2) it 
be executed contemporaneous with execution of original note and 
that its basic structure be clear from the face of the subsequent 
resale documents. 
 Finally, to hold otherwise would immunize the RTC from 
honoring an otherwise valid collateral agreement -- one done in 
writing, contemporaneous with the origination or resale of the 
loan, approved by a bank's directors, and maintained continuously 
in its records -- simply because the loan was resold on the 
secondary market.  Taken to its extreme, the contemporaneousness 
requirement could deny relief to defrauded borrowers even if the 
subsequent loan purchase documents specifically acknowledged the 
existence of a likely fraud claim or defense based upon the 
initial transaction, and the purchase was openly discounted as a 
result. 
 Here, the "agreement" -- GDV's inflated, non-conforming 
appraisals -- is referenced in writing and in detail in the very 
same documents by which Carteret acquired the mortgages.  These 
references are thus contemporaneous with Carteret's acquisition 
of the notes.  Bank examiners were on notice of the problems with 
the mortgages, senior Carteret officials had the opportunity to 
review these "unusual transactions," and there is no allegation 
that "new terms" were added after the purchase agreement.  Hence 
I conclude that plaintiffs have satisfied the contemporaneous 
execution condition of § 1823(e)(2).  
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C.  
 On this appeal the RTC does not contend that the final 
two criteria of § 1823(e) --  approval by Carteret's board of 
directors and continuous maintenance of the loan documents in 
Carteret's records -- are unmet, except in a brief aside that 
cites to nothing in the record but states "[t]he representations, 
warranties and conditions that Appellants seek to enforce are not 
in writing, and hence were not executed by Appellants or by 
Carteret."  RTC Brief at 12.   
 I have already urged that the discussion of the 
inflated, non-conforming appraisals in the Loan Purchase 
Agreements are adequate to satisfy the writing requirement of 
§1823(e)(1).  The only evidence of record before us shows that 
the Loan Purchase Agreements, as well as the commitment letters 
which are incorporated into the purchase agreements, bear 
signatures of various Carteret, GDC, and GDV officials.  App. at 
182, 187, 189, 192, 199, 209, 222.  In addition, the Complaints 
allege that plaintiffs executed mortgages which were originated 
by GDV.  App. at 39, 90. 
 Accordingly, I would not affirm the order of the 
district court on the ground that the third or fourth conditions 
of § 1823(e) are unsatisfied. 
V. 
 It is undisputed that the plaintiffs in this matter 
were defrauded.  Carteret accepted the loans with knowledge of 
that fraud, and that knowledge was readily ascertainable from a 
reasonable inspection of the loan documents.  Neither the purpose 
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or language of the statute would be satisfied by denying 
plaintiffs the right to assert such fraud so readily apparent and 
so flagrant. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of 
the district court. 
